Annual Report 1998-99

非討價還價、人質和最優產權的關係 Non-cooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownership 決策科 學與企業經濟學系趙耀華敎授的論文《非合作討價還價、人質和最優產權的關係》，獲刊於最具權威的 經濟學報《美國經濟評論》一九九八年九月號。該文説明經理人員在某些條件下，受僱時的人力資本投資意欲 和勤奮程度比自僱時為高。這解決了不完全合約學派未解之謎——為何合資公司和股份有可能是最優的安排。 該文在刊登之前，已獲美國一些著名大學（包括哈佛）的經濟學系指定為相關研究院科目的閲讀材料。趙敎授 已獲得研究資助局的甄選撥款，繼續這方面的研究。 A paper of the same title by Prof. Stephen Y.W. Chiu of the Department of Decision Sciences and Managerial Economics was published in the September 1998 issue of the prestigious economic journal —the American Economic Review. Prof. Chiu shows how a manager may have a stronger incentive to make relationship-specific investments when he/she is hired than when he/she is also the owner. This goes beyond the original incomplete contracting approach to explain the optimality of joint ventures and shared ownership in general. Before it was published, the paper had been included as reading material for related graduate courses in the economics department s of some prestigious universities, including Harvard. Prof. Chiu is currently doing related research on the theory of the firm with an earmarked grant from the Research Grants Council, the name of the project being 'Bargaining, Competition, and Investment Choice'.